How do failed coup attempts during civil wars impact conflict management? Many studies have explored the factors influencing conflict management and peace processes. However, our understanding of the evolving dynamics of the bargaining environment during a war is still limited. By focusing on failed coup attempts in civil wars, I argue that these events alter the bargaining environment, increasing the likelihood of negotiations but decreasing the probability of negotiated settlements. Failed coup attempts reveal the information about the presence of internal challengers within the government. This motivates government leaders to seek a temporary cessation of hostilities with rebels, compelling them to focus on defense against internal threats. Meanwhile, rebels, recognizing their enhanced bargaining position, are also incentivized to negotiate, thereby increasing the likelihood of negotiations. However, the incomplete nature of the information from these failed coups can hinder rebels and the government from finding mutually acceptable terms, exacerbating commitment problems between them. Consequently, the likelihood of negotiated settlements decreases. The hypotheses are supported by a series of tests using data on civil war termination and coup attempts between 1975 and 2013.