A Durable Peace? Peace Agreement with Drug-funded Rebels

Abstract

How do illicit drug economies impact the success of peace agreements? This question has been largely overlooked in the literature. In this paper, we address this oversight by examining how a rebel group’s involvement in the illicit economy influences the durability of peace following a peaceful settlement. Specifically, we assess the likelihood of group fragmentation and the subsequent levels of violence. We contend that peace agreements signed by rebels reliant on illicit drug economies are more susceptible to fragmentation and recurrent violence. Due to the lucrative nature of the illicit drug trade, the benefits of peace agreements often favor rebel leaders, leaving the rank-and-file members discontented. These lower-ranking rebels, given the motives and opportunities stemming from the illicit drug economies, may revert to illegal activities. Consequently, they are more likely to rearm in order to expand their dominion over drug operations, countering government anti-drug initiatives. This can lead to group fragmentation and sustained violence post-peace agreement. Incorporating territorial provisions in peace agreements, however, could potentially mitigate this outcome by offering collective benefits to the entire rebel faction. We test this hypothesis by examining rebel fragmentation and patterns of violence from 1990 to 2015.

Do Young Gong

Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science M.S. Student in Applied Statistics

My research interests include international relations, armed conflicts, the interdependence between political violence, and leader survival.